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ABSTRACT 
A new piece of equipment has been purchased in a lot of size m. 
Some of the items can be used in destructive testing before the item 
is put into use. Testing uncovers faults which can be removed from 
the remaining pieces of equipment in the lot. If t c m pieces of 
equipment are tested, then those that remain, rnt = m - t, have 
reduced fault incidence and are more reliable than initially, but rnt 
may be too small to be useful, or than is desirable. In this paper 
models are studied to address this question: given the lot size m, 
how to optimize by choice of t the effectiveness of the pieces of 
equipment remaining after the test. The models used are simplistic 
and illustrative; they can be straightforwardly improved. 
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1. Problem Setting 
A new piece of equipment has been produced, and is to be tested before being 
put into use. An example is a military missile. Ultimate testing is done 
destructively by firing shots. The objective is to send equipment to the field with 
as few (design) faults as possible, so testing is focused on finding faults and 
removing them; it will be assumed here that once a fault is discovered it can be 
removed by change of design or componentry, and hence that a mode of failure 
has been permanently removed from all remaining missiles. The problem: if 
missiles are bought in lots of m, and f c rn are tested, then those that remain, mt = 
m - f, have reduced fault incidence and are more reliable (the lot or design has 
experienced "reliability growth"), but mt may be too small to be useful, or than is 
desirable. 
We address two problems. 
(a) Given the lot size, m, how to optimize the effectiveness or lethality of the 
missiles remaining after f(c m) are tested by choice of f; 
(b) In the light of a testing program of length t, how does f depend upon m; or 
how does lot size affect the final product's qualify, where quality measures 
the probability of overall success in use? This means that both reliability and 
other suifabilify measures are combined with accuracy and target destination 
probability and other effectiveness measures to obtain an overall success 
probability when the missile is fired. The focus is entirely on maximizing 
operational capability, given the lot size, m. Other calculations can be made to 
address questions of final, after-test, missile adequacy to meet military needs 
particularly when compared to alternative, e.g. currently employed, options. 
The question of characterizing the uncertainty with which such a comparison 
is made is not thoroughly addressed here. 
Related issues arise in reliability growth testing; cf. Ascher and Feingold 
(1984), Balaban (1978), Barlow and Scheuer (1966), Barr (1970), Bhattacharyya ef 
al. (1989), Calabria et al. (1992), Fries (1993), Gross ef al. (1968), Jayachadran ef  al. 
(1976), Mazzuchi et al. (1993), Olsen (1977), Pollock (1968), and Woods (1990). 
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However, in traditional reliability growth testing, there is no constraint on the 
number of tests allowed. 
2. Initial Mathematical Model 
Suppose a missile design initially contains Do potential bugs or faults. If 
present, each of these independently inactivates a missile flight with probability 
p ,  or does not operate detrimentally with probability 1 - p .  It is a considerable 
simplification to assume that p is the same for all fault/bug types, and that p does 
not depend on flight time or other conditions, but this simplification allows a 
quick initial evaluation. Note that if m missiles are built as described, never 
tested but fired, then the number, So, of (later) successful flights is, given DO, 




where s is the probability that a missile with no serious faults survives and 
operates properly. Various other meaningful measures can also be evaluated. 
qsopo] = sm(1- p )  DO I 
2.1 Testing 
Suppose f missiles are test-fired. If some fail it is presumed that (a) the 
particular faults causing failure are identifiable, and (b) that they are successfully 
removed from the remaining missiles, leaving m - t as yet unfired and potentially 
useful in actual operations. Furthermore, these are now more reliable, but there is 
obviously a tradeoff involved in the choice of f. Thus after f are tested (2.1) turns 
into 
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where Dt is the number of potential faults remaining after t test firings. It is 
assumed that we are only removing single "root-cause faults" that can 
themselves bring about missile failure, whereas there actually could be a 
complicated interlocking sequence of fault failures, and a postmortem could 
possibly- identify them, leading to their simultaneous removil. This optimistic 
situation is disregarded here. We also represent, in the parameter s, the influence 
of non-removable faults: items that simply fail but cannot be design-rectified. 
Existence of such can slow down the reliability growth process by stimulating 
search for the unattainable. For the present this bit of realism is ignored, as is the 
possibility that identification of a removable fault leads to replacement by an 
item of higher p-value than that replaced! The present model is optimistic in that 
a new item is essentially compatible with s, not changing it by much. 
2.2 Property of a Test of Fixed Length, t 
In order to choose the test period, t, one can compute the expected value of 
those that survive later (active, combat) flights. This entails removal of the 
condition on Dt in (2:2); one can then pick the t-value so as to maximize that 
expectation. This is one answer to "how much is enough testing" in the present 
context. 
Suppose Do bugs/faults are originally present and we ask how many are 
present after time f. The probability that any one is still present is (I - p ) f ;  by 
independence Dt is binomial: 
with generating function 
€[zD' ID01 = (z(1- p>f + (1 - (1 - p>f)y. (2.4) 
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In turn, the condition on Do can be removed; if goo (z)  is the generating function 
of Do then 
(2.5) 
In Subsection 2.3 we consider Poisson-seeded potential faults. In Subsections 
2.5 and 2.6 we consider potential faults having a discrete uniform distribution 
- 
and a discrete uniform distribution with a random range. 
2.3 Potential Faults are Poisson-Seeded 
If Do is assumed Poisson with mean A then directly it is seen that Dt is Poisson 
with mean A(1-  p)t ,  which has generating function 
~ [ z ~ t ]  = e -A( l-py (1-z) (2.6) 
and (2.2), the expected number of successful missions after testing for time t 
(where 0 5 t 5 m): 
€[St] = s( m - r>e - W - P Y .  (2.7) 
Thus if all parameters (except s) are known, or estimated, we can discover the 
value of t = tvt(m) that maximizes the expecfed number of missiles sent to the field 
that will function properly in use. Thus we have an initial approach to a 
particular problem of pre-determining test duration so as to "optimize" a 
candidate measure of mission success. 
Note that the distribution of Do can be regarded as a Bayes prior on an 
unknown parameter. Then the prior's parameter, A, can be obtained by 
combining expert judgment and data on previous tested and fielded comparable 
systems. This prior can be updated with each test episode using Bayesian 
procedures. This approach is explored in Section 3. 
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2.4 A Max-Min Policy for Poisson-Seeded Faults 
Suppose nature is malevolent and for any number of tests conducted will 
choose p so as to minimize the expected number of successes after performing t 
tests. Let s = I, and assume Do is Poisson with mean Let 
f (PI = lnE[St 1 
t = In(m - t )  - n(i - p )  p .  
d Setting -f(p) = 0 and solving for p results in the minimizing p, pfin = 1/(1+ t). 
dP 
For this value of p 
= (m - t)exp { -a (&Sk}* 
A criterion to choose the number of missiles to test is to pick the number of tests, 
t, that maximizes the above. We will call this policy the max-min policy. Such a 
number must be found numerically; it is of interest to compare its implications to 
those of other procedures. 
2.5 Alternate Potential Fault-Seeding Distribution 
It is plausible that if a system reaches later testing stages its propensity to 
contain many faults is low. Perhaps it is a modification of a previous design (an 
upgrade in military parlance) with only a few subsystems being candidates for 
serious faults. In this case the Poisson model, which admits arbitrarily many 
faults, might well be replaced by one that absolutely limits the number of active 
faults, so we investigate one of the simplest alternatives: a discrete uniform for Do 
over (0, I, 2, ..., 8). Other features remain as before. 





For numerical illustration we match means to that of the Poisson: 2/2 = A; this 
will not always be possible for small A since 2/2 2 1/2. To compare the expected 
number of successful missions after testing using t missiles for the Poisson fault- 





= [ I-- 2 d + a 2 q q  3! -..I 
where a = (1 - ~ ) ~ p .  Thus, for a reasonably small a = (1 - p)tp,  the expected number 
of successful missions after testing will be approximately the same for both 
models. Examine the numerical examples to follow to see that choice of the 
prior's specific form may be of secondary effect. 
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2.6 Second Alternative for Fault-Seeding: Discrete Uniform with Random 
Range 
Suppose the previous setup is generalized by letting 2, the range of the 
uniform, be another arbitrary discrete distribution, denoted {pk;  k = 0, 1,2, ...}, 
e.g., but not necessarily Poisson. From (2.10) - .  
so 
where p(w) is the generating function of {pk}.  
If p(w) = e-P(1- W), Poisson, then we get 




In order to match means it is easiest to calculate 
€poldl = 4 2  so p = 2€[Do]. (2.18) 
Thus, substituting (2.18) into (2.17) for E[Do] = d/2 and letting a = p(1- p)t results 
in 
€[ (1 - p ) D f ]  = -2-6 - e- y. (2.19) 
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Comparing (2.19) and (2.12), it is seen that the expected number of successful 
missions after testing for the Poisson fault-testing model will be less than that for 
the discrete uniform with Poisson random range. 
2.7 Numerical Illustrations and Implications - 
The meaning of (2.7) is revealed by studying some special cases. Figures 1 - 2 
suggest that while the optimal value of test time certainly depends upon the 
parameter values, which are unknown or must be estimated, the optimum values 
remain in a relatively narrow range, at least over the range of parameter values 
studied. For what seems to be plausible values the numbers proposed for test are 
a smallish fraction of lot size, m. There is a helpful general insight: if p ,  the 
probability of fault activation, is relatively large then a relatively small test tends 
to remove many potential faults, leaving the field reliability high, whereas a 
smaller p-value requires somewhat, but not substantially many, more, since 
leaving low-probability offenders in place is relatively undamaging. The max- 
min policy for A = 5 and m = 100 is to test 13 missiles with resulting expected 
number of successes 75.9. The max-min policy for A = 5 and m = 500 is to test 29 
missiles with resulting expected number of successes 442.5. Figures 1 - 2 show 
that the max-min policy is (not surprisingly) somewhat conservative. 
3. Sequential Destructive Testing: Myopic Bayesian Updating 
With the exception of the max-min analysis given in Section 2.4, the previous 
analysis assumes that the design defect failure probability, p ,  is known, or at least 
that its value may be satisfactorily approximated off-line from data for analogous 
systems, and then treated as "known". Suppose, however, that data are available 
sequentially on the number of design defects that were revealed on an initial set 
of t E (1,2, ...) test firings of the missile in question. We show that such data can 
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be used to provide a sequentially updated inference concerning p ,  and thus to 
decide when further testing is not justified. In Subsection 3.2 we discuss a 
criterion which compares the expected number of successes with the current 
posterior distribution of p with that if we look forward to doing one more test. In 
Subsection 3.3 we discuss the criterion which is to test until all remaining 
(untested) missiles will be successful with a preselected probability. The problem 
we discuss is related, but not identical to, much work on sequential sampling and 
decision making. See in particular Chernoff and Ray (1965), and Chernoff (1966); 
Yang et al. (1982) is also related. 
The method described depends on these factors inherent in the basic model: 
Do = the initial number of design defects that exist in the missile system. 
8 = the probability a fault causes a failure in a missile. 
B1 = the number of faults discovered by the first test. Assume all the faults 
are repaired upon discovery. 
As previously, let m be the total number of missiles. 
Assume 
P{Bl = SlDO = do ,e = P} = ( J P  do 4 (1 - P) bl = 0,. ..,do; (3.1) 
(3.2) 
Then 
Let 01 = Do - B1, the number of remaining faults; then from (3.4) it follows that 
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and 
where K ( h )  = 
Similarly, 
where & = DO - (131 + . . . + Bk) , the number of remaining faults after k tests. 
3.1 The Expected Number of Successes after f Tests 
A missile is called a success if no faults occur during its launch or flight. Let 








Suppose one test is done and B1= bl faults are discovered and repaired; let S1 
be the number of successes in the remaining (m - 1) missiles. 
1 
= (m - 1)J e-'('-P)PK(h )f(p)e-* (+)h dp. 
0 
Similarly, if k tests are conducted and Bi faults are discovered and repaired on 
the ith test, the expected number of successes in the remaining (m - k) missiles is 





3.2 The Expected Number of Successes After Looking Forward to Doing One 
- -  
More Test 
Before any tests are conducted consider the expected number of successes if 
one test were conducted. Let Sf be the number of successes using the remaining 
(rn - 1) missiles. From (3.4) 
(3.10) 
Thus, 
Suppose k tests have been done which resulted in B 1 =  bl, ..., Bk = bk faults 
being discovered and repaired. Consider the expected number of successes if one 
more test were conducted. Let S l  be the number of remaining successes if 
another test is conducted. From (3.6) it follows that 






A stopping rule might be to stop testing at fB tests where 
fg =min 0 k:ESklB1  =q, . . . ,Bk=bk]>€[Sk+lBl  =h,...,Bk=bk]+C} 
where C is a constant chosen by the analyst; possibly C = 0. We will call this rule 
the (myopic) Bayes rule. 
3.3 The Probability of No Failure in the Remaining Missile Firings After 
Conducting t Tests 
An alternative procedure is to test until all remaining (untested) missiles will 
be successful with a preselected probability. After f tests, 0 I f I rn, the proba- 
bility all the remaining missiles are successes is 
(3.16) 
if p and ;1 are known. 
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If A is known but p is not known, then 
P{Sm-f =m- t ,B1  =h ,..., Bf =bf ,Df  = k , O ~ d p }  
where 
Thus, 
P{Sm-, =m- t ,B1  = b l ,  ..., Bt =bt ,OEdp} 
and 
I [  
1 




where K =  jf(p;bl, ..., bt) . [: r 
A rule to stop testing may be to do fp tests where 
where a = 0.8, or 0.9, etc. 
Numerical integration is required to carry out the above procedures, e.g. to 
evaluate integrals in (3.81, (3.9), (3.12), (3.15) and elsewhere. We have used 
Simpson's rule with up to lo* order difference correction for a step size h:0.0001 
(cf. Hamming (1973)) as implemented in A Graphical Statistical System, AGSS. 
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3.4 Numerical Examples 
Figure 3 presents the expected number of successful missile flights after 
having conducted t tests as a function of t for a series of design fault discovery. 
There are three faults. One fault is discovered at test 3; one at test 4; and one at 
test 6; if-no tests are conducted, the number of faults discovered is 0. The prior 
distribution of the number of faults at time 0 is assumed to be a Poisson 
distribution with mean A = 3. The prior distribution for the probability of fault 
discovery, 0, is uniform over [0,1]. The number of missiles in the lot m = 25. The 
solid line plots the expected number of successes with no additional tests, (3.7) - 
(3.9). The dotted line plots the expected number of successes if one additional test 
is considered (3.15). The dashed line plots the expected number of successes if a 
fixed number of tests are conducted for A=3 and probability of discovery 
having the prior distribution, that is, from (2.71, 
1 
E" t I=  (m - sl e-%('-PYf(p)dp. (3.21) 
0 
A criterion which maximizes the expected number of successes for a fixed 
number of tests would stop testing after 4 tests. A criterion which stops testing 
when doing one more test would not result in a larger expected number of 
successes would also stop after test 4. Both criteria would miss the one fault that 
does not appear until test 6.  The max-min policy obtained using (2.9) for m = 25 
and A = 3 would also test 4 missiles. 
Figure 4 displays plots of the probability that all (m - f) remaining missiles are 
successes after conducting f tests. There are 25 missiles initially. The prior 
distribution of the initial number of faults is Poisson with mean 3. The prior 
distribution for the discovery probability is uniform over [0, I]. The solid line 
displays the probability of all remaining missiles being successes as a function of 
16 
the number of tests using the same fault discovery series and (3.19) using the 
posterior distribution of the discovery probability. The dotted line is the 
probability of all remaining missiles being successes as a function of the number 
of tests using the prior distribution of the discovery probability (fixed number of 
tests) 
1 -A( l -p ) f [ l - (  l - p ) 7  
P { S ~  =m-t}=Je  f ( P P P .  (3.22) 
0 
Consider the decision rule to test until the probability that all remaining 
missiles are successes is at least y for y= 0.8. For the uniform prior, the fixed 
number of tests calculation would test 6 .  The Bayes calculation would test 12. 
Both criteria recommend a larger number of tests than the expected number of 
successes criteria. 
4. Discussion 
Our model directly addresses a real challenge faced by the testing 
community: to test efficiently with operational needs in mind. The present 
formulation is limited and simplified, but suggests the kinds of results to be 
expected, and that can be practically obtained. In particular the max-min 
approach (Sec. 2.4) provides a conservative assessment of a defensible 
conservative number of tests that one might consider making. This approach is 
quite robust to aspects of the model formulation (it actually accommodates 
different fault failure probabilities). The sequential myopic Bayes approach 
(Sec. 3) justifies adjustment of test effort to actual data obtained; it probably 
requires further detailed development before being practically applicable, but the 
needed modifications are understood, and are being made. 
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Implementation of the present approach requires a certain amount of 
computing, all within the range of desktop PCs or laptops. It is likely that user- 
friendly spreadsheet realizations of the current software can be developed. 
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